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I ooUR first article on the historical background of the proposed new
rules of civil procedure for the United States courts authorized by
the Act of Congress of June 19, 1934, we traced the developments of fed-
eral practice at law under the Conformity Act and in equity under the
uniform equity system and pointed out the real steps toward an amal-
gamation of the federal law and equity systems which had taken place
after the adoption of the Uniform Equity Rules of 1912 and the Law
and Equity Act of 1915.1 As a conclusion we urged the adoption of
rules providing for the complete union of law and equity, a conclusion
which we had expected to support by further reasons in this article.
The action of the United States Supreme Court in the meantime has,
however, made elaboration of the point no longer necessary. On May 9,
1935, the Chief Justice in his annual address to the American Law Insti-
tute announced that the Court had decided to act under the second
section of the Act, and, in accordance with its authorization, to draft
rules for a united system in the federal district courts. So definite was
the decision, so forcefully and persuasively was it stated, so completely
were the arguments to the contrary answered and demolished, that it
is now believed the considerable discussion which had developed on this
point will be set at rest.2 Our earlier article had characterized the op-
portunity of procedural reform afforded by the new Act as a challenge
to the profession and a test of its ability to keep its methods of work
abreast of the needs of an increasingly complex social organization.m3
i-Dean of the School of Law, Yale University.
:*Teaching Fellow, Yale School of Law, 1935.
1. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Bachkgrourd (1935) 44
YA= L. J. 387.
2. 2 U. S. L. Week, May 14, 1935, at 866, 880: "After careful consideration, the Court
has decided not to prepare rules limited to common law cases but to proceed with the
preparation of a unified system of rules for cases in equity and actions at law, 'so as to
secure one form of civil action and procedure for both,' so far as this may be done without
the violation of any substantive right."
3. Clark and Moore, loc. cit. supra note 1. Se also Clark, The Challenge of a New
Federal Cifil Procedure (June, 1935) 20 ComR. L. Q. 443.
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The response of distinguished practitioners and jurists to the call to
serve on the committees already appointed in the various districts to
consider and make suggestions as to the new rules4 shows not only the
greatest interest but an intense desire on the part of lawyers to see that
the plan is carried to a successful conclusion. Now that the Court has
so promptly chosen the one workable way of making the plan effective,
we can feel confident that this reform, so long supported by the American
Bar Association and pressed to such dramatic legislative success a year
ago by the Attorney General, will be real, complete, and lasting.
In view of these developments the detailed discussion which we had
contemplated for this article seems no longer desirable. Since, however,
certain differences in methods of achieving the united system are still
possible or arguable within the limits of the plan as now adopted by the
Court, we think it profitable to point out these possibilities, at least in
summary form. Accordingly we discuss briefly the ways of providing
for the union of law and equity, and the rules of pleading and of parties
and joinder of actions which may be developed by using the Uniform
Equity Rules of 1912 as a basis for action. These will provide the central
framework of the new structure, although many important details deal-
ing with matters as important as evidence and appellate review, process,
venue, summary judgments, declaratory judgments, discovery, and mo-
tion and trial practice must be left for consideration at another time.6
I. THE UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY
At least three possible models may be considered in planning the
new federal rules for a united system of law and equity. One is in
substance what might be termed the "hangover" system, since it still
maintains a formal division, the separate law and equity dockets being
maintained, although comparatively free interchange is permitted. It
may be that the new ,Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1934 is of this form,
since its chief annotators apparently so interpret certain ambiguous
4. As to these committees, appointed by the judges at the suggestion of the Attorney
General acting for the Court, see (1935) 20 MAss. L. Q. 41-44; 2 U. S. L. Week, March 19,
1935, at 661, 676; 18 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 163, 164.
5. As to evidence we have already indicated our tentative conclusions in favor of "a
uniform and unified federal system of rules of evidence such as now exists in the equity
and admiralty cases and under most recent decisions, in the criminal law cases." Clark and
Moore, supra note 1, at 415. As to appellate review we have urged a single form of review,
and the abolition of a separate type of review in law and equity cases. Id. at 414, 429-434.
The new federal declaratory judgment act, 48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 400
(1934), needs to be carefully considered and worked into the procedural framework. This
should not be extremely difficult. See New York Rules of Civil Practice, Title 25; Bor-
chard, Declaratory judgments (1934) on the procedural and substantive aspects of tif
new remedy.
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provisions.' Another is the historic code practice of New York, which,
although desirable in purpose, was limited in practical operation because
of unfortunately ambiguous and narrowly interpreted provisions for
jury trial and its waiver. And finally there is the effective system
exemplified by the English and Connecticut practice of substantially
complete union, with jury trial preserved except where waived by fail-
ure to claim it. Thjatter we urge as the model to be followed.'
As to the first plan, it may well be said that it is not different
enough from the present federal system to justify the change, and that
it is already foreclosed by the Supreme Court's determination to provide
for a real union. In any event we believe it should not be followed. It
operates to preserve the form after the substance has been rejected as
undesirable. That is, it forces a determination of the difficult and con-
fused distinction between law and equity for a more unsubstantial pur-
pose than in the old days. Then, at least, the distinction meant the dif-
ference between a trial before a common law judge and jury in King's
Bench or the Court of Common Pleas or before the Chancellor alone
in the court of chancery; now it means simply a shift from one calendar
to another. In this connection we may repeat what the senior author
hereof said in discussing the Illinois Act:
"Amalgamation of law and equity and abolition of forms of action is often
objected to on the grounds that legal and equitable remedies are inherently
different and that our law of rights grew out of our law of remedies. This is
true but not particularly apt or pertinent to the problem how to get the issues
in our modem cases most quickly and effectively before the court. The daily
grist of a trial court is composed largely of contract and negligence cases
wherein it little boots any one to puzzle over the ancient distinctions among
debt, covenant, account and assumpsit, general and special, or between trespass
and case. In the more involved cases concerning our complex commercial life
involving corporations and business trusts, debenture bonds and trust receipts,
receiverships and reorganizations, and new and unprecedented state and federal
legislation, there is little occasion, at the issuc-formidating stage of the case,
to go back on historical excursions. Moreover where a judge is sitting without
a jury, as he does more and more when dockets become crowded and jury
waver automatic, it is not going to help him much in deciding whether or
not to issue or continue an injunction to recall that once on a time there was
an historic struggle between Coke and Ellsmere in which equity triumphed.
6. The Illinois system was criticized in Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933)
1 U. oF Ci. L. REv. 209, 211-216. For the annotators' views see McCaso-ill, Jenner and
Schaefer, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (1933) Art. VI; c. Millar, Pleadings Under
the Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 28 InI. L. Rev. 460. For discussion of the general
code system see Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 1; Clark,
Trial of Actions Under the Code (1926) 11 Cowx. L. Q. 482; CLs-r, CODE PLr.A;G (1928)
47 et seq.; Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YAixz L. J. 645; Walsh, Merger of Law ad
Equity Under Codes and Other Statutes (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. REv. 157; WALmH, EQ=w-
(1930) 96-131; (1928) 37 YArxn L. J. 654, 661-666.
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It is true that occasionally at the trial such historical study may be apt and
pertinent; but it should be made only when it is of actual importance. So
the difference in form of trial between equity and law, so much emphasized
by our pleading pundits, may at times engage the court's attention and call
for a real determination after a claim for jury trial is actually made. There
is no occasion to consider this or others of these historical difficulties as form-
ing iron limitations within which the pleadings must be held for fear of the
occasional case which at trial may present the question. Too much fear has
been expressed of dangers which in most cases will not arise at all and which
can be met and disposed of without difficulty when they do arise. Thus the
remote danger that a possible litigant may at some time be deprived of his
jury trial right by a failure of the court to perceive some of the historical con-
notations of his case is too unsubstantial a basis to justify ancient formalism
in pleading in all cases."1
7
The recently published report of the "Study of the Business of the
Federal Courts" shows that the bulk of the federal court litigation is not
greatly different in totals than as above indicated. Of all federal civil
cases only a few over three per cent reach the stage of a jury verdict,
and twenty-seven per cent reach the stage of court decision. The great
majority of the cases are terminated before trial is reached. Outside of
the prohibition injunction cases (important at the time the Study was
made), the law cases are more numerous than the equity cases and of
these the suits of negligence (under the Employers' Liability Act and
seamen's actions) bulk largest, followed by simple contract actions.8 In
other words, in the federal courts, as in the state courts, there is a large
amount of ordinary litigation, the greater part of which does not go to
trial, and for which simple and direct forms of pleading are desirable.
The pleading stage of the litigation ought not to be complicated by
questions as to the form of trial which are not then at issue and in the
great majority of cases may never be at issue. Much of the remaining
federal litigation is of a specialized and novel nature due to the new
federal acts, where the ancient distinctions are not in point anyhow. In
other words, retention of the distinction is no gain but involves much
loss in delay and confusion and possible substantial errors of justice.
The complications made necessary by preservation of even the formal
distinctions may be recalled by noting the difficulties, listed in our for-
mer article, still obtaining in the federal system, notwithstanding the
comparatively free transfer of cases from docket to docket permitted
after the Law and Equity Act of 1915. Among the matters now in dis-
7. The New Illinois Civil Practice Act (1933) 1 U. or Cm. L. Ray. 209, at 213, 214,
8. Of 9,852 cases studied (for the year 1930) in thirteen districts, 3,919 were law
actions (650 being liquor cases) ; 1,857 were admiralty actions (758 being liquor forfeitures) ;
and 4,076 were equity actions (2,447 or sixty per cent being liquor actions). Cf. the suits
at law: 1,286 were for negligence, 100 for other torts, and 867 for contract. A STrD or
=E Busm'ss or THE FEDERAL CouRTs, Part II. Civil Cases (1934) 59, and Detailed Tables
4-9, at 113-122. For the statistics on terminations of the case see Id. at 65-77.
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pute in the lower federal courts are:' the effect of error in bringing the
case to the wrong side of the court (whether the error may be waived,
whether the point may or should be raised by the court, the manner and
extent of formal correction and whether it may be made during trial and
the effect on the form of trial); the same problem presented even more
acutely when the error is found only after the action has reached the
appellate court (whether the point is now waived or is unsubstantial,
whether there must be a reversal and order of transfer with new trial,
or reversal and dismissal of the action); whether, in default of express
provision, legal and equitable claims may be combined in a single suit
and the cognate question, upon which the courts have divided, whether
the equitable claim may be brought in by way of the plaintiff's replica-
tion; how far, in default of express provision, a legal counterclaim may
be filed in an equitable action, and, if so, whether the right to a jury trial
is lost;'" the difficulties caused by the fact that the defendant may, but
is not required, to plead equitable defenses in actions at law and hence
may bring his own separate suit in equity on the same transaction
already in litigation at law; the doubt whether third parties may be
brought in to answer to an equitable defense in which they are involved
or whether separate suits must be required, and so on. Moreover, the
prime questions of the form of trial, court or jury, and the form of appel-
late review-of the facts, as in equity, or only on the law-are still not
thoroughly settled as to the various combinations of law and equity
now permitted; though the Liberty Oil case settled the practice, at least
so far as equitable defenses are concerned, in accordance with the better
view that these matters were determined by the nature of the issues and
not by the "side" of the court to which the action had been brought.11
If this unnecessary and wasteful confusion is to be avoided, nothing
short of a provision as extensive as that of the original Field code pro-
viding for the single form of civil action and abolishing "the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits heretofore existing" will be sufficient. It should be
made clear also that all matters of defense or counterclaim, whether legal
or equitable, should be pleaded.' -
9. For documentation of these points, see cases cited and discussed in Clark and Moore,
supra note 1, at 416-435.
10. The view apparently is that since jury trial is waived, the plaintiff may object to
the filing of the counterclaim. Clark and Moore, supra note 1, at 426. Under the ccdes
the counterclaim may be fled as matter of right and the trial is to the court. See cita-
tions note 6, supra.
11. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, 260 U. S. 235 (1922); and see Clark and Moore,
supra note 1, at 428, 429. The question referred to in note 10, supra, indicates the typa- of
problems still unsettled.
12. N. Y. LAws 1848, c. 379, § 62; FIaST REP. OF Com'ns Om PnAc. ,.D PL=mE;G (x.
Y. 1848) 67-88, 131-147; cf. N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 8, 262; and the statutes of other states cited
in CLARK, CODE PLEmDIaG 46, 47, 390, 491, 492.
1935] 129S
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When this is done, the next important point concerns jury trial and
waiver. Here the original New York code has caused difficulties. It
listed the kinds of actions in which jury trial might be had, and thereby
raised the question, troublesome ever since, as to whether the statute
was merely declaratory of the constitutional right of jury trial or added
to it; it also provided in effect for jury waiver by affirmative action and
thus raised troublesome questions as to when a waiver had occurred.
Now the better construction of the New York statute on jury trials18
is that it is declaratory only, and that when, for example, it gives the
right of a jury trial in "an action in which the complaint demands judg-
ment for a sum of money only," it does not include claims for balances
due on an accounting; and when it grants a jury trial in an action "for
a nuisance," it refers to the old common law action of nuisance and not a
suit to enjoin a nuisance. 4 But the New York courts have not been
wholly consistent and notably in the pleading of equitable defenses or
counterclaims have allowed not the issue, but the form of complaint to
govern. In ultimate analysis the difference between a defense and a
counterclaim is illusory; and yet the right to a jury trial is rested upon
this unsubstantial basis.'" The right should not depend on matters
essentially of nomenclature only, but on the historical method of trying
the particular issue. 6 That is the right safeguarded by the Constitu-
tion, no more and no less.
The statute should therefore declare this historical test in unambiguous
terms. This is achieved, for example, in the Connecticut statute giving
the right of trial by jury in "civil actions involving such an issue as,
prior to January 1, 1880 (the effective date of the code), would not
13. N. Y. C. P. A. § 425, providing for a jury trial (unless waived or a reference Is
directed) of issues of fact "in each of the following actions": "1. An action in which the
complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. 2. An action of ejectment; for
dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to recover a chattel." The usual code provision
(taken from the original New York code) designates the jury actions as those "for the
recovery of specific real or personal property, with or without damages, or for money
claimed as due upon contract, or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries." CAL.
CODE CIv. PROC. § 592 and statutes cited in Clark, Code Pleading 56.
14. Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 482, 487, 488;
Clark, Code Pleading 58, 59, also citing cases from other jurisdictions; cf. 35 C. J. 159 et
seq.
15. Susquehanna S. S. Co. v. A. 0. Anderson & Co., 239 N. Y. 285, 146 N. E. 381
(1925). This decision is criticized by Clark, supra note 14, at 490-498; and in COon PLR=-
3o at 63, 64, 430, 431; (1926) 11 Coax. L. Q. 496; (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 33 et seq. But
see (1925) 25 COL. L. Rav. 630. The decisions in the other states are contrary. Ibid.;
cf. Swasey v. Adair, 88 Cal. 179, 25 Pac. 1119 (1891); (1925) 13 CALIF. L. Rav. 345; Nor-
ris v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks' Nat. Bk., 43 Ohio App. 396, 183 N. E. 92 (1932).
16. In the Susquehanna case the court reserved to itself the right to determine whether
the matter pleaded was a defense or counterclaim; but so illusory was the test that In the
long run the mere form or name of the pleading is likely to be determinative. See articles
cited note 15, supra.
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present a question properly cognizable in equity."' 7 Provisions similar
in form and purpose should be drafted for the new federal procedure.' 8
Finally, to make the procedure completely workable, there should be
adequate provisions for waiver of trial by jury. Parties really desirous
of their constitutional right and seasonably asserting it should of course
be entitled to it; but the matter should not be left in doubt until the
trial is had. Particularly should it not be possible for a party to gamble
on the result and, by keeping his position ambiguous, be able to assert
his claim for a jury after he has lost out on trial to the judge. This has
happened under the original code provisions in New York. Under this
code, waiver in effect is only by express affirmative action or by going
to trial to the court.19 This statute, narrowly construed as it has been,
has enabled a defendant who knew what the issue was from the begin-ning to obtain a reversal and new trial, if not dismissal of the case
after it had gone against him. The plaintiff had set forth his facts and
erroneously claimed equitable relief; the defendant had answered, with-
out claim of jury trial, but alleging facts which showed the action to
be legal; then after his, liability to damages had been shown at trial, he
obtained a reversal because of the wrong form of trial.20
To avoid such opportunity to speculate on the outcome, the right to
jury trial should be held waived unless claimed in writing within a speci-
17. CosNe. GFra. STAT. (1930) § 5624; cf. ComN. P.pc. Bz. (1934) § 39: "All matters
which, prior to January 1, 1880, were within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, whether
directly or as an incident to other matters before it, unless otherwise ordered, shall ke
heard and decided by the court without a jury, in the manner theretofore practiced in
courts of equity.' Section 5624 is a lengthy statute which directs the court clerk to keep
a docket wherein he shall enter as "jury cases" all actions within the provisions quoted
and certain other specified actions such as probate appeals affecting the validity of the
wills, provided written request for jury trial has been made to the clerk within thirty days
after the return day of the case or ten days after an issue of fact is joined or upon
written consent of all parties or by order of court; other cases All be entered on the
docket as "court cases" and shall be tried to the court. Rules of court also carry out the
system, e.g., Co-eN. Pimc. Br. (1934) §§ 130, 132, 136, 148, 149, 152, 153.
18. See also L,n. Ascs. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 437: "Issues of law and issues of fact in
causes that prior to the 18th day of June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall
be tried by the court," etc.; cf. Ky. CoDEs (Carroll, 1919) §§ 6, 11, 12, "actions of which
courts of chancery had jurisdiction before the first day of August, 1851," etc.; and E:r.xsrr
Rur.rs oF T=R Surmpx CoURT, 0. 36, r. 3 an 4. And for the statutes see Clark, Code
Pleading 56, 57.
19. N. Y. C. P. A. § 426, providing for waiver by four modes: (1) failing to appear at
trial; (2) filing with the clerk a written waiver; (3) oral consent in open court; (4) goin3
to trial. For similar statutes see Clark, Code Pleading 68, 69. See note 22, hifra.
20. Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917) (action for bra-ch of
contract claimed by the plaintiff to be one of partnership and by the defendant to be
one of employment only; the judgment entered below upon the report of a referee
finding no partnership and awarding damages for breach of contract was revers-ed).
Contra: Williams v. Slote, 70 N. Y. 601 (1877); Dotsko v. Szymaniak, 133 isc. 657,
233 N. Y. Supp. 167 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
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fled time after the action is brought or issue joined. This is already
the rule in many states,21 and has recently been made the rule in the
New York counties which comprise the City of New York.2 It satisfies
the constitutional requirement.'e It clarifies the situation long before
trial, and makes unlikely rulings such as that just cited wherein the
pleader's theory of the action, rather than the issues raised upon the
facts, is permitted to determine this important right.24
Under provisions such as these a workable union of law and equity is
effected. The pleading stage of the trial is used to develop the respec-
tive stories of the parties as to the past events out of which the lawsuit
has grown. It is not hampered by worry and confusion about the form
of trial. (That is being taken care of by an entirely separate written
claim or by the rule of automatic waiver of jury trial.) There is no ques-
tion, in any event, as to the form of trial unless a party seasonably
makes definite written claim for it; otherwise the case goes automatically
on the judge's calendar for trial without jury. There are no separate
"sides" of the court and no separation of law and equity cases. For
convenience in dispatch of court business, the jury cases may be heard
successively, and then the court cases. That is the only division of
business. In practice, the case will go automatically on the jury calen-
dar if there is a timely demand, unless the opposing party objects. If
objection is made, then and then only will the issue of the form of trial
21. For the Connecticut Statute, see note 17, supra. See also MAss. Gm . LAWS (1921)
c. 231, § 60; Omro GEN. CODE (1926) § 11466 (applying to Hamilton and Cuyahoga coun-
ties only); R. I. G=T. LAws (1923) c. 336, §§ 7, 8 [Mandeville, Brooks & Chaffee v. Fritz,
50 R. I. 513, 149 At]. 859 (1930)]; English Rules under Jun. ACT, 0. 36, r. 2 and 6, and
other statutes cited in Clark, Code Pleading 68, 69. See further ALBmETA, RULES or CT.
(1914) §§ 172, 184; BprI. COL. SuP. CT. RuLES (1925) 0. 56, r. 2 and 6; NEW BRuNswxc9,
Jup. Acr (1927) 0. 36, r. 2 and 5; ONTARio, Ju. AcT (1927) § 57 (1); AUSTRALIA Hlo0t
CouRT PROCEDURE Acr, 1903, § 12, RULEs, 0. 30, r. 2 [QuicK AND GROOM, Ion COURT
PRACricE (1904) 219, 336].
22. N. Y. LAWS 1927, c. 696, and 1929, c. 196, amending C. P. A. § 426 (note 19, supra)
by providing for waiver in New York, Bronx, Richmond, Kings and Queens counties where
there is failure to make written demand therefor and pay the jury fee at the time of serv-
* ing notice of trial, or within twenty days thereafter, where the notice is served by the
opponent. For the effect of this provision in relieving the congestion of jury cases,
see Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration (1928) 2 CONN. BAR J. 211, 226, 227;
Clark and Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 867, 873; CLARK, Covr
PLEADING 54.
23. McKay v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 75 Conn. 608, 54 At]. 923 (1903); Craig v,
City of New York, 228 App. Div. 275, 239 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1st Dep't, 1930),
24. To insure this construction, however, the provisions with respect to the complaint
should make clear that the demand for judgment is no part of the cause and has operative
effect only when the defendant makes default of appearance, and that a "theory of the
pleadings" is not rigidly required. Cf. note 44, infra; and for discussion see Clark, The
Complaint in Code Pleading (1926) 35 YAL L. J. 259.
25. Cf. the '!court" and "jury dockets" under the Connecticut practice, note 17,
supra.
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become important, and it will be settled by an examination of the his-
torical precedents." This simple system has made possible the smooth
operation of the most successful Anglo-Saxon pleading systems, as in
England and her colonies, and in Connecticut, California and other
Western states.
H. THE PLEADiNGS
In providing for the pleadings of the parties in the new federal civil
action, advantage may be taken of the model furnished by the Uniform
Equity Rules. In general, these rules (notably rules 18-21, 24, 25,
29-35)"s set forth not merely the best thought in English and American
procedure of the date when they were adopted, but even of the present
time. Of course they deserve careful examination, first, to make sure of
wording, so that they are made applicable not merely to suits in equity
but to all civil proceedings, second, to see if the form of expression can
be improved upon, having in mind, however, that the words used may
have a value merely because they are familiar to the profession, and,
third, to see whether details can be improved, and desirable additions
of newer devices (e. g., motion for summary judgments) made. With-
out attempting final judgments on all these details, we now consider the
framework supplied by the existing equity practice and the law prac-
tice under the Conformity Act.
a) Pleading objectives; liberal construction; amendment
Under the present system the Conformity Act controls actions at law
so that the federal attitude toward the pleadings in law actions is deter-
mined by that of the state where the federal district court is sitting.
Thus pleadings have been construed strictly in some states and liberally
in others; 29 and amendments have been refused, permitted, or deemed
26. As in Roy v. Moore, 55 Conn. 159, 82 At. 233 (1912).
27. Cf. authorities cited in notes 17, 18, 21, supra.
28. Rule 18 abolishes technical forms of pleadings; Rules 19 and 28 provide for liberal
amendments and for the disregarding of unsubstantial error; Rule 20 provides for further
and better statements of the nature of claim or defense; Rule 21 deals with scandal and
impertinence and Rule 24 states the effect of counsel's signature to a pleading; Rule 25
sets forth the requirements for a bill of complaint; Rule 29 deals with defnzcs and
abolishes the demurrer; Rule 30 with answers and counterclaims; Rule 31 with the
reply; and Rules 32 to 35 deal with answers to amended bills, testing sufficiency of defenzc s
and supplemental pleadings.
29. At the Pleading stage, strict construction: Lyons v. Reinecke, 10 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A.
7th, 1926); see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. R. Co, 264 Fed. 355 (N. D.
Ga. 1920). Liberal construction: Bryson v. Gallo, 180 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910) (trial
stage); United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corp., 5 F. (2d) 703 (W. D. Wash. 1925) ; Walker
v. Traylor Engineering Co., 12 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
Recovery was permitted on a different theory than that alleged in Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co. v. De Clow, 124 Fed. 142 (C. C. A. Sth, 1903); Davis v. Bsemer City Cotton
2lls, 178 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); N. P. Pratt Laboratory v. Buffalo Forge Co.,
1935] 1299
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immaterial when not made, in general accord with the attitude of the
applicable state practice toward variance and failure of proof." The
most important problem arises at the trial and may be thus stated: Can
the pleadings be now amended to let in proffered proof or to cover proof
already in without injustice to the adverse party, either by way of mis-
leading him, or by depriving him of the form of trial to which he is
rightfully entitled, as where the litigation was begun as an "equity" suit
and is about to be terminated by an award of "legal" relief, or vice
versa?31 In either situation, however, amendment should be freely
had, for nothing is to be gained under a unified procedure in forcing the
parties to start over. Where the parties have been really deprived of
the trial to which they are rightfully entitled, it may be necessary that
a new trial be ordered; but more often, the parties should be held to
knowledge of all possible rights which might flow from the facts alleged
and thus to have waived a right of trial which they had not promptly
claimed. If the parties have fairly litigated the transaction giving rise
to the dispute, and on the proof one of them is entitled to substantive
relief, then variance or failure of proof is usually only a peg upon which
counsel may hang an argument, occasionally to sustain an erroneous
decision,"2 but more often to reverse an obviously sound result."
Uniform Equity Rules 19 and 28 provide for liberal amendments and
184 Fed. 287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); but not in Ward v. Morrow, 15 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926); and see Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A, 2d, 1919)
(there can be no recovery for fraud and deceit in an action of negligence).
30. Thus, under Virginia practice, proof that the accident causing injury to the plain-
tiff was due to the moving of one of the two cars of the defendant involved in the
accident, rather than the other, was reversible error under an allegation naming the other
as the moving car; though apparently an amendment at the trial would have cured the
defect. Norfolk & A. Terminal Co. v. Rotolo, 179 Fed. 639 (C. C, A. 4th, 1910); cf., how-
ever, Norfolk & Portsmouth Traction Co. v. Rephan, 188 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 4th, 1911).
On the other hand, a federal court in Ohio applied the code test of immaterial variance
and held that, since the defendant had not actually been surprised, even an amendment
was not necessary. Bryson v. Gallo, 180 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910). See also Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Raulerson, 267 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. Sth, 1920), cert. denied, 254
U. S. 646 (1920), for a realistic approach to variance; and E. I. Du Pont Do Nemours
& Co. v. McCullen, 260 Fed. 607 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919) (where there probably was surpri se).
As to the effect of present federal legislation on amendments, see Clark and Moore, supra
note 1, at 409-410, n. 105.
31. See Bryson v. Gallo, 180 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910); Clark and Moore, supra
note 1, at 417-423.
32. Covington Cotton Oil Co. v. Bickmore Nitrating Cotton Co., 271 Fed. 80 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1921).
33. Bryson v. Gallo, 180 Fed. 70 (C. C. A. 6th, 1910); Atlantic Coast Line 1. Co, v,
Raulerson, 267 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. Sth, 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 646 (1920); U. S. F. &
G. Co. v. Whittaker, 8 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) (here judgment was reversed becauso
the complaint did not state a cause of action, and hence could not be aided by a general
finding, although both parties had disregarded their pleadings to a great extent; the
lack of amendment seems a purely formal matter).
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command that error not affecting the substantial rights of the parties
be disregarded at every stage of the proceeding. The practice under
these rules has been quite in the spirit in which they were drawn t Since
it accords -with the best state practice and that now followed on the law
side of the federal courts in these states, these rules indicate a desirable
form for the new procedure.
b) The Complaint
Since the state practice is followed on the law side, pursuant to the
Conformity principle, we find in the federal cases at law the same diffi-
culties as to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations as in the states.
Common law pleading was devoted to the development of an issue; with
the development of code pleading and other modern systems, less em-
phasis was placed upon the issues and more on presenting the facts.
The reason for this was in the main the endeavor to avoid the necessity
arising under the common law forms of the moving party deciding at his
peril on the correct legal theory applicable to his case. Typically under
modern pleading, therefore, the plaintiff states what happened and the
court is called upon to apply the law to it. But too great insistence
upon pleadings alone was made by the early code courts, and fine dis-
tinctions between "facts" on the one hand, and "law" or "evidence" on
the other, were drawn. Now it has come to be appreciated that the dis-
tinction is one between generality and particularity in stating the tran-
saction sued upon and that considerable flexibility should be accorded
the pleader. 5
The federal practice, which has also reflected this dispute, has like
the states held that stricter rules of specific allegation are required only
if particularity is seasonably demanded, and objections of this kind
raised at or after trial are not to be met with favor.c0 So, in an action
34. "No variance between the pleadings and the proofs is material unless of a character
to mislead the opposite party." 2 FosmTn, FEDERAL PirLmcE (1920) 1165 (citing casas);
see also Snxnss, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE (1934) 576-550.
35. For extensive discussion of the problem see Cook, Statement of Facrt in Pleading
Under the Codes (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 416 [criticizing the "dry, naked, actual facts" of
POmEROY, CODE REmEDIEs (4th ed.) 560]; Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading (1926)
35 YA.E L. 3. 259; Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Adion (1935) 20 Co.. L. Q.
185; Ross, Minnesota Pleading as Fact Pleading (1929) 13 Mn;ne. L. REv. 343; Dowdall,
Pleadng Material Facts (1929) 77 U. or PA. L. REv. 945; 1 Cr-K, CAsas O:. PxznrG
Am PRocEnDuR (1930) 91-124.
36. United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62 (1933) (tax refund claim
which is indefinite and does not comply with the Treasury requirement may be corrected
by amendment where the Department was not prejudiced by the claim, but acted upon
it); Glaspie v. Keator, 56 Fed. 203 (C. C. A. Sth, 1893) (a general averment of damages
sustained by deceit is cured by verdict); Rush v. Newman, 58 Fed. ISS (C. C. A. 8th,
1893); Norfolk & Portsmouth Traction Co. v. Rephan, 188 Fed. 276 (C. C. A. 4th, 1911)
(after verdict the entire declaration may be looked to in determining whether defendant
was sufficiently informed to enable it to defend intelligently, although the state practice
treats each count as a distinct cause of action).
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for damages under the Sherman Act a petition which alleged little more
than a combination and conspiracy by the defendants to the plaintiff's
damage, without setting forth the manner or extent of his injuries, was
stricken from the files on motion. 1 And in an action by the govern-
ment to recover overpayments made to an army-camp contractor, it was
held that the petition must contain such reasonable particularization
as will indicate upon what matters evidence is to be given, and that a
general allegation of fraud, of waste, and the purchasing and reselling
of materials and equipment at a profit was too indefinite.88 Thus, a
statement by the plaintiff to the effect that he feels himself generally
aggrieved is not sufficient. But the generalized statement offered by the
"common counts," so-called, employed in the common law action of
assumpsit, and generally under the codes, in spite of the criticism of
writers, offers a simple and effective means of stating common, recurring
business situations.39 Even in the infrequent type of case such as one
to recover penalties under the Safety Appliance Act, an allegation that
the violation occurred "on or about" a particular date will be good
against an objection in law.40 In all these cases the court is demanding
what is under the circumstances an adequate statement of the fact
transaction to identify it with reasonable certainty, not to set forth all
its details.
Under the new federal civil procedure there need be no material
change in these principles: good and bad craftsmanship in pleading will
remain as before. Equity Rule 18, which abolishes technical forms of
pleadings, and Rule 25, which specifies the contents of a bill of com-
plaint, may be utilized by making them no longer applicable solely to
suits in equity, but to all civil actions. It is true that, like the codes,
Rule 25 provides for "a short and simple statement of the ultimate facts
upon which the plaintiff asks relief, omitting any mere statement of evi-
dence," and that the problem of "ultimate facts," "evidence," or "legal
conclusions" has caused difficulties similar to that experienced under
37. Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 Fed. 741 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
38. United States v. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 Fed. 229 (S. D. Ohio 1923), afi'd, 16 F.
(2d) 895 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
39. See Myers v. Hurley Motor Company, 273 U. S. 18 (1927); Millett v. Omaha Nat.
Bank, 30 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). For discussion of the use of the "common
counts" under code practice, compare (1917) 4 CArw. L. REV. 352; Clark, supra note 35;
PommoY, CoDE Rzmwms (4th ed.) §§ 436-438.
40. United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 168 Fed. 175 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909) (de-
fendant's remedy is a bill of particulars if the declaration is too vague). Where the state
practice has recognized such use, a plaintiff has been enabled to make use of exhibits,
not only as a particularization of his allegations, but to preclude a technical attack
at trial upon the admissibility in evidence of the originals. Alexander v. Gordon, 101
Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900). For the practice of striking out an exhibit as impertinent
see Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cities Service Co., 270 Fed. 994 (D. Del. 1920).
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state code practice.4 ' Perhaps an improvement in phrasing can be
made.42 But the expression is familiar, has been given content by many
decisions, and possibly will serve our purpose better than a new verbal
formula, if we understand the necessity of giving meaning to it by judicial
exposition and trial expediency.
Equity Rule 25 also provides that the prayer for relief may be stated
in the alternative form. While the plaintiff cannot now claim equitable
and legal relief alternatively,43 if the rule were expanded to cover all
civil actions, a plaintiff could, for example, sue for specific performance
and seek alternative relief by way of damages as under state code prac-
tice. It should be made cear, however, in accordance with the spirit
of the unified procedure as pointed out above, that the demand for
judgment is no part of the cause of action and limits the type of relief to
be granted only in case the defendant defailts of appearance."
c) Defendant's pleadings.
1. Pleas in abatement and bar.
Equity Rule 29 requires defenses "heretofore presentable by plea in
bar or abatement" to be made in the answer. A similar practice is found
41. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 (1910) (An answer alleging that the "blow
post and checking act" violated the Constitution, the grounds being that it is in violation
of the commerce clause and a direct burden upon and impedes interstate traffic, impairs
the usefulness of defendant's facilities for that purpose and is imposible to observe in carry-
ing mails and in interstate commerce, is insufficient, since it states mere conclusions of Jaw.
But see Justice Holmes' dissent); cf. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S.
194 (1934); noted in (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 25 (A distributor of milk having a "well
advertised trade name" sought to enjoin the enforcement of that section of the NXw Ycba=
MIL: CONTROL LAW which authorized dealers not within that class to undersell it in New
York City. A motion to dismiss should not be sustained, because the complaint, read
in the light of the novelty of the measure assailed and of facts of which the court may
take judicial notice, stated valid constitutional grounds of attack, since no rational basis
for the law is apparent from facts of common knowledge, and if it rests on particular
trade conditions in a given locality, these cannot be judicially noticed and are properly
the subject of findings based on evidence after trial, in accordance with EQun= RULE
702).
42. For a recently suggested substitute see Wheaton, supra note 35, at 209.
43. Rushing v. Mayfield Co., 62 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. Sth, 1932), cert. denied, 2S9
U. S. 750 (1933). As to the desirability of alternative pleading generally se Hankin,
Alternothie and Hypothetical Pleading (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 365; (1924) 34 id. 103;
(1919) 33 HARv. L. REv. 244; (1926) 10 Mm'er. L. REv. 356; Clark, supra note 35.
44. For a discussion of this problem see Clark, supra note 35, and Cr..Rrx, CoDE Pr ,a -
3nG 179-187. As there pointed out, confusion occurs under many of the codes which
limit the type of relief only "where there is no answer," thus raising a problem whether
a technical answer or only default of appearance is meant. Of this form is N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 479; for a better form see OHio Grzi. CooE (Page, 1926) §§ 11281; OI.MI Colp. STA .
A=a. (1931) § 166. For arguments for more extensive scope to the demand for judgment,
see McCaskll, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. 3. 614, 634-636; LfcCAS-
xML, JENNum cA S HArm, =os Cvr PnAc cE Acr AxzmormAi (1933) 73.
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on the law side of the federal courts in states which have provisions,
common among the codes, for such compulsory union of defenses. The
practice has caused difficulty on the law side, for the code general denial
may then put in issue the allegation of diversity of citizenship as the
ground of federal jurisdiction-matter which under the common law
practice would not have been in issue on pleading to the merits.40 This
tends to force the plaintiff to a trial of the jurisdictional issue in prac-
tically all such cases; though, unless there is a real contest on the point,
the plaintiff should not be put to the trouble and inconvenience of the
proof.4 Equity Rule 30 tends to prevent such an abuse by requiring
the defendant to state his defense to each claim, "avoiding general de-
nials, but specifically admitting, denying or explaining the facts upon
which the plaintiff relies, unless he is without knowledge, in which event
he shall so state, and this shall be treated as a denial. ' 48  And Rule 29,
45. Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U. S. 653 (1892); Leonard v. Merchants' Coal Co., 162
Fed. 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908). Formal attacks upon pleadings denominated pleas in
abatement, however, have not been sustained where the only fault was that they
should have been entitled answers. Jones v. Rowley, 73 Fed. 286 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1896) ;
Whelan v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 111 Fed. 326 (C. C. D. Mont. 1901). Com-
pulsory joinder of abatement and bar is found in all the code states, except three. Clark,
CODE PL.ADINo 410-412. See also Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Insurance Co., 279 U. S.
405 (1929) (plea to the jurisdiction for lack of service conjoined with plea in abatement as
authorized by state practice).
46. Since, under the common law practice, if the defendant wanted to contest the
grounds of diversity he was obliged to raise it by a plea in abatement, which, of course,
was waived by a plea in bar, it often happened that, although it developed at trial that
there was no diversity, the courts nevertheless felt themselves powerless to dismiss at
that stage, since such matter in abatement had been waived. To correct that, the Act of
1875, 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. § 80 (1926), was passed laying upon the courts
the duty to dismiss at any stage upon discovering the lack of jurisdiction. This ade-
quately safeguards the courts against collusive or unwarranted attempts to found jurisdic-
tion. See Hill v. Walker, 167 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909), cert. denied, 214 U. S. 517
(1909), for a good analysis of the problem.
47. Roberts v. Lewis, 144 U. S. 653 (1892); Cole v. Carson, 153 Fed. 278 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907); Lindsay-Bitton Live Stock Co. v. Justice, 191 Fed. 163 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
The harsh result has led courts to seek escape when possible. Emmke v. De Silva, 293
Fed. 17, 19 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) (The inference being plain that diversity existed, the
court said: "The Inn Co. made no claim below, nor does it make any here, that It Is a
citizen and resident of any State other than Missouri. . . .No one knew as well as the
Inn Co. the State to which it owed its corporate life. Not having raised the question
in the court below, we think, under the circumstances, it is now too late to raise it for
the first time here."); Hill v. Walker, 167 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908), cert. denied, 214
U. S. 517 (1909) (the requisite proof was discovered amidst the evidence---see the Lindsay-
Bitton case, supra, for this explanation); and see City of Detroit, Mich. v. Blanchfield, 13
13 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
48. Under code practice, attempts to eliminate general denials have not been successful,
as they (like the "common counts," note 39, supra) are convenient pleading shorthand,
which the profession is unwilling to give up. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 392-396. It is therefore
doubtful whether the new rules should prohibit their use. This, however, is not inconsistent
with rules requiring the defendant, if he wishes to raise certain issues, to do so by specific
A NEW FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
giving the court discretion to hear and dispose of the matter in abate-
ment before the trial of the principal case, is the analogue of the better
practice on the law side of the federal courts today.'0 Thus issue-form-
ing is speeded up by compelling matter in abatement and bar to be set
forth at one time; yet there are safeguards against possible inconven-
ience that might arise by conjoining such matter.
As to pleading to the merits, the state practice has been followed on
the law side of the federal courts in construing an answer to determine
whether it puts in issue certain allegations of the complaint. 3  It has
been held that the following defenses must be specially pleaded: title
that has accrued to the defendant subsequent to the commencement of
the ejectment action;5I res judicata, 2 release,"3 truth in a slander or
libel action,' unconstitutionality of the statute sued upon where facts
are needed to demonstrate its invalidity,5s and illegality;"° and that non-
performance of a particular condition precedent could be put in issue
only by a special defense, and not by a4 general denial 7  And although
pleading; and the issue of federal jurisdiction is certainly one where such obligation can
properly be placed on the defendant. EQUny Rurx 25 requires in the complaint "a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends," and it
would be appropriate to require this allegation to be pleaded to specially.
49. Compare City of Detroit, Mlich. v. Blanchfield, 13 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926),
requiring such matter as lack of diversity to be heard before trial on the merits, if at
all, with Leonard v. Merchants' Coal Co., 162 Fed. SSS (C. C. A. 2d, 1903), postponing
the hearing on the matter of venue to the trial stage of the principal litigation. And zee
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Keever, 260 Fed. 534 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919),
cert. denied, 250 U. S. 665 (1919), where the defendant utilized matter in abatement in
the most dilatory fashion, and where at common law he would have had a judgment
quod recuperet entered against him. See also discusion of "Objections in Point of Law,"
text accompanying notes 74-77, infra.
50. Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233 (1889).
51. Hardy v. Johnson, 1 Wall. 371 (U. S. 1863) (state practice, with slight modifica-
tions, had been adopted by rule of the federal court).
52. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Barker, 93 Fed. 158 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899) (Loubsana
practice); cf. Southern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 168 U. S. 1 (1897)
(holding that in equity the plaintiff might avail itself of a former judgment without
specially pleading it), see Moschzisker, Res Judiata (1929) 38 YArL L. 3. 299, 332-334,
for a discussion of pleading res judicta, arguing that the policy underlying the doctrine
should not be made to turn on pleading.
53. Kalloch v. Hoagland, 239 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917).
54. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Sloan, 250 Fed. 712 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
55. Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524 (1910); see note 41, supra.
56. Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. C. A. Hoover Distilling Co., 182 Fed. 59o (C. C. A. sth,
1910). If, of course, the illegality appears on the face of the contract, or from the opening
statement of plaintiff's counsel or from plaintiff's proof, then it becomes the duty of the
court itself, if necessary, to raise the objection in the due administration of justice.
Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 (1880).
57. Halferty v. Wilmering, 112 U. S. 713 (1885) (applying the Iowa statutc-a not
unusual statute under code practice); CLARX, CODE PtrzEnG 192, 425.
19351
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matter constituting a definitive defense could be raised under a general
denial, a federal court has permitted it to be pleaded specially. It is
believed that pleading such matters specially affords more adequate no-
tice than a practice which would permit defenses of this type to be raised
under a denial, and is in accord with the theory of pleading under Equity
Rule 30. A rule defining the practice as to these ordinary and oft re-
curring issues would be helpful.35
Whether a defendant could plead inconsistent defenses at law has
varied with the state practice.6 0 Equity Rule 30 permits the defendant
to "state as many defenses, in the alternative, regardless of consistency,"
as he deems essential, and this would seem to be the better rule for the
new procedure.61
2. Counterclaims
On the law side this matter has been governed by the state practice, 2
which is often technical and confusing63 On the other hand, Equity
Rule 30, if extended to apply to all civil actions, furnishes a simple and
satisfactory guide in general accord with the modern notions on counter-
claims: the defendant must set up any counterclaim arising out of the
transaction sued on, and may set up any set-off or counterclaim which
could be the subject of an independent suit; and parties may be brought
in when necessary, if they are subject to the court's jurisdiction.
0 4
58. English v. Ralston, 112 Fed. 272 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1901). On the other hand,
under some practices a defendant has not been required to plead contributory negligence,
although the burden of establishing such a defense in the federal courts is upon him.
Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 73 Fed. 76 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) (for reasons why a system
of pleading should permit such a defense under the general issue see the concurring
opinion of Lacombe,. J., 74 Fed. 362); Long Island R. Co. v. Darnell, 221 Fed. 191
(C. C. A. 2d, 1915). But a defendant may have to verify a general denial to put in
issue facts which are part of plaintiff's prima face case, such as execution of the instru-
ment sued on. Bell v. The Mayor and Council of the City of Vicksburg, 23 How. 443
(U. S. 1859); County of Rals v. Douglass, 105 U. S. 728 (1881); St. Louis, Iron Moun-
tain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Knight, 122 U. S. 79 (1887). And a general denial may
be qualified by admissions contained in other defenses. School Dist. No. 11, Dakota County,
Neb. v. Chapman, 152 Fed. 887 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), cert. denied, 205 U. S. 545 (1907).
59. As in English 0. 19, r. 15; CoNN. PRAc. BI. (1934) § 104, p. 46; N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 242; Am. Jud. Soc. Rules of Civ. Proc. Bidletin 14 (1919) art. 15, § 27.
60. Hummel, Adm'r v. Moore, 25 Fed. 380 (C. C. D. Col. 1885) (permitted). Contra:
Tomkins v. Paterson, 239 Fed. 402 (W. D. Wash. 1917).
61. CLARK, CODE PLFADING 432-435.
62. Davis v. Bessemer City Cotton Mills, 178 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910),
63. See cases and materials in 2 CLARK, CAsES ON PLEADINO AND PROCWURE' (1933)
511-535.
64. See American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U. S. 360 (1922), for an author-
itative exposition of the rule. It was subsequently amended in 1925 to permit the bring-
ing in of third parties. For materials on the modern developments affecting counterclaims,
see 2 Clark, op. cit. supra note 63, at 511-512.
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d) Reply and Rejoinder
Equity Rule 31 does away with the necessity of a reply or of further
pleadings after the answer is filed, except that a set-off or counterclaim
must be pleaded to; yet permits the court to order a reply in its discre-
tion. On the other hand, at law the question whether a reply is needed
to controvert new matter in the answer, not constituting a set-off or
counterclaim, has varied with the state practice,' which has even been
followed where it deprives the judge of the discretionary power to order
a replication. 6 Confusion can be avoided under the above rule, and yet
flexibility can be retained by the discretionary power left with the
court.
6 7
e) Objections in Point of Law
Since the methods of raising legal objections to pleadings on the law
side has depended upon the particular state practice in point, there has
been considerable diversity in the methods employed. Thus in some
federal courts the demurrer has been used to raise the statute of limita-
tions, even without specifying what particular limitation statute is meant;
while in others it cannot be so used.6" It has also been employed to
attack an unverified plea. 9 Where the general demurrer for substance
has been abolished, a demurrer on the ground that the plea is insufficient
in law is defective in form;7" and a demurrer specifying causes will be
65. Burlington Ins. Co. v. Miller, 60 Fed. 254 (C. C. A. Sth, 194) ; Hartley v. Lap'dus
& Holub Co., 216 Fed. 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); see Walker v. Traylor Engineering &
Alfg. Co., 12 F. (2d) 382, 386 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926). It has also determined whether
matter to avoid the statute of limitations should be set up in the complaint or pleaded
in the reply by way of avoidance. Boatman's Bank of St. Louis, Mo. v. Frit.len, 221
Fed. 145 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915), cert. denied, 238 U. S. 641 (1915) (properly pleaded in
replication). For a discussion of this problem and the view that the equity practice,
requiring the pleader to set forth his position immediately, is preferable, see Clark,
supra note 35, at 275-277.
66. Pringle v. Storrow, 9 F. (2d) 464 (D. Mass. 1925). Here the defendant pleaded a
sealed release. If the plaintiff is to rely on fraud in the execution to avoid the rele_,
then it can be proved in the law trial; but if the fraud relied upon is in the inducement,
then the issue is to be tried to the judge, usually before the law action, and it is to the
interests of all parties and the court that the plaintiff be compelled to state his defews.
Actually he was obliged to set forth his objections to the release by a bill of particular.
67. See Kentenia Coal Co. v. Tyree, 4 F. (2d) 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), where the
plaintiff was contending that there should have been a rejoinder, although in effect the
affirmative matter of the reply was nothing more than an affirmative traverse of defenive
matter in the answer; and ef. Pringle v. Storrow, 9 F. (2d) 464 (D. Mass. 1925), cited note
66, supra, illustrating the need for discretionary power in the court.
68. Compare Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U. S. 72 (1876), Davis v. Mills,
121 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903), and Young v. California State Board of Pharmacy,
273 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), with Barnes v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 54 Fed.
S7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1893).
69. Bell v. The Mayor and Council of the City of Vicksburg, 23 How. 443 (U. S. 1359).
70. Brown v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 181 Fed. 246 (C. C. W. D.
Tenn. 1909); Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993 (Al. D. Tenn. 1920).
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limited to those specified. 71 There has also arisen in some federal courts
the problem so troublesome and confusing in state practice of differen-
tiating between demurrers and various forms of motions to strike or
expunge. 72 But in others the demurrer has been abolished and a motion
may be used to raise all legal objections.73 This represents some ad-
vance in simplicity of procedure, but may be limited in practical effect
mainly to a change of name only. A more desirable change is that
adopted by the equity rules, following the English practice, by which
objections in law can be raised by motion or incorporated in the answer
and may be heard in advance of trial in the discretion of the court.
4
In fact discretion as to the time of hearing objections in law has already
been asserted on the law side.75 Even more effective than the Equity
Rule might be the adoption of the complete English plan whereby points
of law are normally heard at the trial and are only heard in advance
of trial by consent of the parties or order of the court, thus limiting the
wasteful preliminary hearing, so susceptible of use for purposes of delay,
to cases where the decision on the point of law substantially disposes
of the whole case.76 Such provisions should also be supplemented by
rules for the summary disposition of cases by motions with support-
ing affidavits.77
71. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 93 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 3d, 1899).
72. United States v. Forbes, 259 Fed. 585 (M. D. Ala. 1919), aff'd, 268 Fed. 273 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1920).
73. Jack v. Armour & Co., 291 Fed. 741 ,(C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Ebsary v. Raymond
& Whitcomb Co., 300 Fed. 685 (W. D. N. Y. 1924) [notwithstanding U. S. Rev. Stat.
954 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. § 777 (1926) which was said not to require expressly the
preservation of demurrers, but was merely a recognition of such forms of attack].
74. EQUTry RuLEs 29 and 33.
75. Townsend v. Jemison, 7 How. 706, 716 (U. S. 1849) (when the decision is to be
made is "a matter of sound discretion in the court rather than of fixed or inflexible
right"); Rosenbaum v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 37 Fed. 7 (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1888); Kent
v. Bay State Gas Co., 93 Fed. 887 (C. C. D. Del. 1899); McCarty v. Neilson, 239 Fed. 151
(ED. Pa. 1917). It seems that the federal courts may also exercise their discretion in
permitting the losing party on a demurrer to plead over, although the state practice will
usually be followed. Green v. Underwood, 86 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898); Boultbco
v. International Paper Co., 229 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 1st, 1916); United States v. Oregon-
Washington Rr. & Navigation Co., 251 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); cf. Eourry RuLS
29 (answer to be filed within 5 days after motion to dismiss the bill is denied), and 33
(the court may allow an amendment upon terms where an affirmative defense, set-off, or
counterclaim is found insufficient).
76. EN . JuD. AcT, 0. 25, r. 1-4; Worthington & Co., Ltd. v. Belton, 18 T. L. R. 438
(C. A. 1902); C.ARK, CODE PLEADiNr, 371-373. Judicial statistics indicate that com-
paratively few cases are disposed of by decision of preliminary issues. Clark, Fact Re-
search in Law Administration (1928) 2 CONN. Bar J. 211; A STUDY OF TnE BusMa.s orF
THE FEDERAL CoUars, Part II, Civil Cases (1934) c. V and VI.
77. Supporting affidavits to bring forth extrinsic matter have been used, for instance,
to show that pleas were sham and frivolous. United States v. Forbes, 259 Fed, 585
(M.D. Ala. 1919), aff'd, 268 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920); cf. Conrad Rubber Co. v.
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f) Miscellaneous pleading rules
Under the practice in some states, and hence under the conformity
principle in federal cases at law, a distinction is drawn between a motion
to make more definite and certain and a motion for bill of particulars,-3
and it has been thought that Equity Rule 20 establishes the same dis-
tinction. 79 But since the purpose of securing more accurate information
about the case in advance of trial is the same in both, the form of motion
should not be important."0 Such motions no doubt have been useful in
securing information which would lessen surprise,8' but since they re-
sult in suppiementary pleading, and are hedged about by conditions, "-
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 15 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) (holding that
the state practice did not warrant striking out sham pleadings). For the view that the
equity practice does not warrant a "speaking" motion see Snsx;s, F mLzmz PnL-crTcn (1934)
616-618. A new procedure should also include not only provisions for summary judg-mnt,
one of the most important new procedural remedies (not here discuss-ed for limitations of
space), but the New York provision whereby a defendant by affidavit and motion can
raise for summary disposition issues of defense of an oft recurring nature, such as the
statute of frauds, the statute of limitations, and payment and release. N. Y. C. P. Rrims
107, 108, 110, 111; CLARK, CODE PLAr. %DUG 386, 387; cf. Ball, The New Procedure Rules
of 1932 (1932); Millar, The "New Procedure" of the English Rules (1932) 27 Irx. L. Rm,.
363; Davies, The Englsh New Procedure (1933) 42 YArx L. J. 377.
78. For instance in Wisconsin no distinction is drawn, while it is in New York. 2
Fosnm, FanFr-,u PRAccE (1920) 1245. Under the Conformity Act the state rule on
bill of particulars has been applied. Snxnqs, FrnArL PRAerrc (1934) 46.
79. Ashton Valve Co. v. Bailey, 6 F. (2d) 235 (N. D. Cal. 1925) (motion to make more
definite and certain will not be treated as a motion for bill of particulars), criticized in
(1926) 24 M cH. L. Rr~v. 315. See also 2 Foster, loc. cit. supra note 78.
80. United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 Fed. 229 (S. D. Ohio, 1923), aff'd, 16
F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927).
81. Illustrative cases where bills of particulars have been granted are: trade slander
case where the defendant was uncertain whether the derogatory statements had been made
by an authorized representative, O-So-Ezy Mop Co. v. Channel Chemical Co., 230 Fed.
468 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); where the defendant to a suit for commis-nons counterclims
for nonperformance he must assign the acts upon which he predicates misconduct, John
F. Walsh & Co., Inc. v. Kurzkasch Co., 4 F. (2d) 746 (E. D. N. Y. 1925); plaintiff has
been compelled to state his defense to a sealed release, Pringle v. Storrow, 9 F. (2d) 464
(D. Mass. 1925).
Denied: in an alienation of affections case, Harper v. Harper, 252 Fed. 39 (C. C. A.
4th, 1918); in a trade libel suit founded upon circulars widely sent out and where the
number of people to whom the libel was communicated is peculiarly within the knowledge
of the defendant, Shryock v. S. P. Calkins &I Co., 248 Fed. 649 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918);
where the object was to secure evidence, Alaska S. S. Co. v. Katzeek, 16 F. (2d) 210
(C. C. A. 9th, 1926); defendant has not been required to divulge the acts relied on as con-
stituting contributory negligence, Bowker v. Donnell, 226 Fed. 359 (S. D. N. Y. 1915);
cf. Havholm v. Whale Creek Iron Works, 159 App. Div. 578, 144 N. Y. Supp. 833 (2d
Dep't, 1913).
The grant or denial of a bill of particulars rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court. Harper v. Harper, 252 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); Alaska S. S. Co. v. Katzeek, 16
F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
82. A motion for bill of particulars will be granted only in so far as it seeks "facts"
which could have been pleaded, and not "evidence," since it is a part of, or an amendment
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they are at best inefficient methods of securing accurate pre-trial in-
formation. They need to be supplemented by modern methods of dis-
covery.83
III. PARTIES
a) Party Plaintiff-Real Party in Interest
The substantive law must determine who is the holder of a right
sought to be enforced, but the manner of the enforcement and the formal
party plaintiff may be considered a procedural question.' Thus on the
equity side the practice has been that he who has the right is the real
party in interest, the person to pursue the remedy;" while on the law
side by virtue of the Conformity Act the rule has depended entirely on
the applicable state practice.38 But inasmuch as the equity practice has
to, the pleading which it amplifies. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 12 F.
(2d) 271 (D. Del. 1926). Such a motion must not be a mere fishing expedition, or seek
information available to the party applicant. SIMCmIs, FEDERAL PRACIcE (1934) 46.
83. See RALAND, DiscovEan (1932). Compare EQuITY RuLE 58. Treatment of this
subject will be considered in an article dealing with proof. EQurry RULES 34, 21, and
24 on supplemental pleadings, scandal, and impertinence, and signature of counsel may well
be adapted to the new procedure; and the equity rule omitting verification of the plead-
ings except in certain special cases seems desirable. See EQuT RULES 25 and 27; Smxivns,
FmEPAL PRAcncn (1934) 512; cf. CrAnK, CODE PLrAmNG 522-525, 378, 142-146. For the
present practice at law following state systems on verification, see Bell v. The Mayor and
Council of the City of Vicksburg, 23 How. 443 (U. S. 1859); County of Rails v. Douglass,
105 U. S. 728 (1881); St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Ry. Co. v. Knight, 122 U. S.
79 (1887); S. M. Hamilton Coal Co. v. Watts, 232 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916),
84. Edmunds v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 80 Fed. 78 (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1897); Thomas-
Bonner Co. v. Hooven, Owens & Rentschler Co., 284 Fed. 377, 383 (S. D. Ohio, 1920),
aff'd, 284 Fed. 386 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922); Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest
(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 258, 261-262, 276.
85. EQUITY RULE 37. "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest, but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a
party expressly authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining with
him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. . . ." This is substantially the
original New York Code provision, and is but declaratory of the equity practice which the
framers of the code adopted. CLARx, CODE PLEADING 93-97.
86. Where the common law prevailed an assignee could not sue at law. Nederland
Life Ins. Co. v. Hall, 84 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 7th, 1898). But where this rule has been
changed by a "real party in interest" statute, the assignee, or partial assignee where
timely objection is not made to nonjoinder of the assignor, may maintain the action In
his own name. Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 U. S. 379
(1888); Delaware County Commissioners v. Diebold Safe & Lock Co., 133 U. S. 473 (1890)
(suit by partial assignee); N. & G. Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 275 U. S. 431 (1928).
See American Surety Co. v. Scott, 63 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933), applying the
Colorado practice which apparently distinguishes a legal and equitable assignee, regarding
the former but not the latter as a real party in interest. Since the real-party-in-interest
provision is an adoption of the equity practice, and the equitable right of a subrogee to
sue has been recognized, Turk v. Illinois Cent. Rr. Co., 218 Fed. 315 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914),
it is believed that in the interests of a unified procedure such a distinction is unsound, and
that difficulty can be avoided by not making it.
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been quite generally adopted in the states, the prevailing rule at law is in
harmony with that on the equity side,87 and hence without causing sub-
stantial change in federal practice that part of Equity Rule 37 which
deals with the real party in interest may serve as a model for a unified
procedure.8
The phrase, "the real party in interest," used in the equity rules, is
one made current by code pleading. It was not a fortunate choice of
expression, for it led courts to assume that some "real," in the sense of
beneficial, interest was required of a party plaintiff with resulting havoc
to various rules of substantive law. But it is now well settled that the
phrase refers only to the one given the right of action by substantive
law. Thus, for example, a trustee not only may sue, but often may be the
only real party in interest to sue on a particular cause of action affecting
the trust res. Possibly the phrase has now assumed too familiar and
consecrated an aspect to justify attempts at improvement in expression8 3
Since the holder of the bare legal title is regarded as a real party in
interest and may sue in his own name, and as it is his citizenship which
is looked to for jurisdiction, a problem often posed along with the one
under discussion is the jurisdictional one raised by the assignment of a
claim or the appointment of a particular individual as administrator or
guardian to defeat or found federal jurisdiction. The assignment of a
87. Under the applicable state practice the federal courts have held the following to
be proper plaintiffs: administrator suing under a wrongful death statute, Mecom v.
Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284 U. S. 183 (1931) (Oklahoma); guardian suing for the
ward, Mlexican Central Railway Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429 (103) (Texas), City of
Detroit, Mlich. v. Blanchfield, 13 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) (Michigan) [but cf. Vcos
v. Neineber, 68 Fed. 947 (S. D. Ohio, 1895) (infant, not the next friend, is the real party in
interest)]; subrogee, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed.
426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911) (Ohio) [d. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530
(1933)] ; assignor where assignment was equitable, American Surety Co. v. Scott, 63 F. (24)
961 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933) (Colorado); assignee for security purposes, Dexter, Horton & Co.
v. Sayward, 51 Fed. 729 (C. C. D. Wash. 1892) ; assignor for an assignee pmdente lite, City
of Greensboro v. Southern Paving & Construction Co., 168 Fed. SS (C. C. A. 4th, 13),
cert. denied, 217 U. S. 602 (1910) (North Carolina) [cf. Sternberger v. Continental Mines,
Power & Reduction Co., 259 Fed. 293 (D. Colo. 1919) (in equity plaintiff's asAae was
ordered substituted, but it was held that his citizenship would not defeat jurisdiction)];
but not an agent and attorney in fact appointed to sue, Denman v. Richardson, 284 Fed.
592 (W. D. Wash. 1921), aff'd, 292 Fed. 191 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) (but see Albany & Rens-
selaer Co. v. Lundberg, 121 U. S. 451 (1837), applying the New York rule of Con.iderant
v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 389 (1860); and CLAR, COD PLADDNG 96].
88. Adding to the real-party-in-interest clause the statement that an executor, ad-
ministrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name
a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly authorized by
statute, may sue in his own name tended to confuse the subject at the outset; but in
the main the courts have evolved a broad, liberal conception of the real party in interezt.
Cr.4,RK, CODE PLEADIn;G 117-130. Therefore since the provision has received specific con-
struction that is satisfactory it may be well to adopt Equity Rule 37 without substantial
change.
89. Clark and Hutchins, loc. cit. supra note 84; Cr-.a.r , CODE: PLEADIMG 93-130.
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chose in action to found jurisdiction is now precluded by legislation;90
but apparently resort may be had to the device for the purpose of de-
feating jurisdiction." And perhaps a policy has been judicially worked
out in favor of defeating, rather than in founding, jurisdiction in the
guardian and administrator cases. - Here the problem is essentially a
broad one of general policy: Should the diversity jurisdiction be cur-
tailed, and if so, shall it be done by virtue of the terms of a procedural
rule determining the party plaintiff in an action? 3
b) Capacity
On the whole the federal courts at law have followed the state rule
as to the capacity of an individual, a foreign executor, administrator, or
state officer to sue or to be sued,94 but have not been wholly consistent
90. U. S. REv. STAT. § 629 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1) (1926) is generally preclusive.
91. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43 (1886) (resort can only be had to state courts
for protection against such a device); Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34
(W. D. Mo. 1934), discussed in (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 450.
92. The Supreme Court has permitted the avoidance of federal jurisdiction by the selec-
tion of a particular person as administrator. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., Inc., 284
U. S. 183 (1931), noted in (1932) 45 IARv. L. REv. 743; (1932) 41 YAz.a L. 3. 639; (1932)
30 M1cH. L. REv. 1341; (1932) 2 IDAHo L. J. 149. But in the converse situation where
the appointment was arranged solely to found jurisdiction the attempt was unsuccessful.
Cerri v. Akron-People's Telephone Co., 219 Fed. 285 (N. D. Ohio, 1914). But cf. City of
Detroit, Mich. v. Blanchfield, 13 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926). The principles of the
Mecorn and Cern cases are not in conflict because 18 STAT. 472 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §
80 (1926) directs the dismissal or remand of a suit where jurisdiction is collusively founded,
while there is no express legislative policy against the avoidance of jurisdiction.
93. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts (1928) 13 CoR-. L. Q. 499; cf. Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in
Controversies Betweens Citizens of Different States (1933) 19 A. B. A. J, 71, 149; (1932) 45
HAsv. L. REv. 743 (on the matter of general policy.
94. The state rule recognizing capacity followed: Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Humble, 181 U. S. 57 (1901) (married woman); Morning Journal Ass'n. v. Smith, 56 Fed.
141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1892) (married woman); Public Service Electric Co. v. Post, 257 Fed,
933 (C. C. A. 3d, 19i9) (foreign administrator). See also Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557
(1893); and Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 258 Fed. 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919)
(both suits in equity following the state rule recognizing foreign executors).
For the common law rule, and cases following the state rule denying capacity see:
Dixon's Executors v. Ramsay's Executors, 3 Cranch 319 (U. S. 1806) (foreign executor-
rule recognized as often inconvenient); Vaughan v. Nerthup, 15 Pet. 1 (U. S, 1841)
(foreign administrator could not be sued in equity; the case recognizes that as early
as 1812 Congress had, however, authorized foreign executors and administrators to sue
in the District of Columbia); Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U. S. 16 (1918) (incompetent);
Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18 (1930) (county treasurer of Indiana did not have
capacity to sue in a federal court in New York); New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner,
265 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) (incompetent), cf. Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F. (2d)
531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); Burrowes v. Goodman, 50 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert.
denied, 284 U. S. 650 (1931) (suit against a foreign executor will not be sustained even if
he puts in a general appearance). But if a foreign administrator appears and contests the
case a valid judgment can be rendered against him. Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215
(1892).
The state rule on foreign chancery receiver is not followed, however. See infra notes
99, 102, and accompanying text.
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as to whether it was applied because of the Conformity Act or the Rules
of Decision Act." We suggest that the law of the domicile should settle
the capacity to sue and defend, and that such capacity should then be
recognized by all federal courts.90 The principle of the rule has already
received some recognitionY Further, for a good many purposes the
federal courts have regarded themselves as an independent forum, and
if they are to have a procedure distinctly their own there would seem to
be no theoretical reason why the rule governing capacity to sue or de-
fend should not be uniform-a uniformity settled by the domiciliary
law.
98
Such a rule also is extremely important in dealing with receivers.
The present federal rule relative to a foreign chancery receiver who has
95. Rules of Decision Act relied on: Texas & Padfic Railway Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S. 57
(1901); Morning Journal Ass'n v. Smith, 56 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 2d, 1892). The Conformity
Act was relied on in holding that one adjudged incompetent in New York could not sue in
a federal court in that state, though he had acquired a domicile elsewhere and had there
been adjudged sane. New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner, 265 Fed. 204 (C. C. A. 2d,
1920). But see Coppedge v. Clinton, 72 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), holding that if
the incompetent's reason is sufficient to understand the nature and effect of his act he may
become domiciled in another state, B, despite any law to the contrary of state A which
adjudged him incompetent, and having created the requisite diversity by the change of
domicile may sue by guardian ad litem in a federal court sitting in state A.
96. Such recognition would not affect substantive rights. A case will illustrate. When
a county treasurer of Indiana attempted to sue in a federal court sitting in New York to
collect state revenues he was denied the right on the ground that he lacked capacity to sue.
Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U. S. 18 (1930). Under the rule suggested he would have the
procedural right or capacity to sue. But if the state of New York has a policy which re-
fuses to enforce the revenue laws of another sovereign, a federal court sitting in that state
might follow that rule. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), aWd
on other grounds, 281 U. S. 18 (1930). Or conceivably it might feel free to apply its own
notions concerning the wisdom of non-enforcement. (For a general discussion of the sub-
stantive problem, and a criticism of non-enforcement, see Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement
of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 193; Note (1935) 48 H .v. L.
lxv. 828.) However, it would recognize that the matter was one to he decided on grounds
other than procedural.
The suggested rule would not subject fiduciaries, such as executors and administrators,
to suit in a foreign state merely because they were there served with process. See Thorburn
v. Gates, 225 Fed. 613 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). By analogy to service upon a foreign cor-
poration more than the mere presence of the fiduciary would be necessary to secure a
judgment binding the estate. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S.
189 (1914).
97. By a shift in emphasis from "capacity" as established by the law of the forum to
"domicile" the Tenth Circuit has in effect recognized the suggested rule. Coppedge v. Clin-
ton, 72 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
98. In suits under foreign death damage statutes which provide that the action is
to be brought by the personal representative for the benefit of certain persons, it might
be well to recognize any fiduciary properly qualified and accountable, since the right vests
in him purely as a formal party. Cf. Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11 (1030);
Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 168 U. S. 445 (1897); Teti v. Consolidated Ceal
Co., 217 Fed. 443 (N. D. N. Y. 1914).
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no other authority than that which arises from his appointment is rigidly
one of nonrecognition. 9 But if a receiver is by statute made a "quasi-
assignee" he may sue in any federal or state court.100 And the Supreme
Court has held most recently in Clark v. Williard'0 1 that any title that
he has must be recognized by ;i state, although it may apply its own law
in dealing with him and local creditors. On the other hand, the states
have quite generally worked out a more flexible method of dealing with
the receiver who cannot claim as a "quasi-assignee." A Tennessee court
has said:
"The privilege of suing in jurisdictions other than that of their appointment
is almost universally conceded to receivers now, as a matter of comity or cour-
tesy, unless such a suit is inimical to the interest of local creditors, or to the
interest of those who have acquired rights under a local statute, or unless such a
suit is in contravention of the policy of the forum."'102
But applying the technique of Clark v. Willard the right to sue could
well be recognized in all cases, and yet the policy of the forum could be
effected, without making the privilege of suit turn upon matters of policy.
Able and eminent criticism has been directed toward the law cur-
tailing the extraterritorial powers of receivers who cannot claim as
quasi-assignees.0 3 But the Supreme Court had said:
99. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U. S. 1854); Great Western Mining Co. v, Harris,
198 U. S. 561 (1905); Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 248 U. S. 73 (1918); Laughlin:
The Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers (1932) 45 HRV. L. REV. 429, 431-438. But where
the primary receiver is appointed ancillary receiver in another jurisdiction, alhough on an
ex parte application, and brings suit, the objection to his capacity to sue may not be taken
for the first time in the appellate court. McCandless v. Furlaud, 55 S. Ct. 42 (1934).
See Jud. Code §§ 55, 56, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 116, 117 (1926) for legislative extension of
receiver's authority; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U. S. 77 (1923).
100. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516 (1907) (statute authorizing collection
construed to make the receiver a quasi-assignee, and thus permit suit in the federal
court) ; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912) (his right to sue in another state court
is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution); Laughlin,
supra note 99, at 452-460.
101. 54 Sup. Ct. 615 (1934), 55 Sup. Ct. 356 (1935), discussed in Note (1935) 48
HAsy. L. REv. 835.
102. Hardee v. Wilson, 129 Tenn. 511, 518-19, 167 S. IV. 475, 477 (1914); cf. Irwin
v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 56 N. J. Eq. 244, 246, 38 Atl. 680, 681 (1897). For
discussion of the state law see Laughlin, supra note 99, at 438 et seq. Petitioner In Mc-
Candless v. Furlaud, 55 Sup. Ct. 42, 43 (1934), stated "that a foreign equity receiver is
permitted to sue in 21 states; and that the highest courts of 7 other states have indicated
approval of that view."
103. Laughlin, loc. cit. supra note 99; First, Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers (1932)
27 ILL. L. Rav. 271; Rose, Extraterritorial Actiots by Receivers (1933) 17 Miu. L. Rnv.
704; Annual Report of Special Committee on Equity Receiverships for 1926-27, Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Year Book (1927) 299; Notes (1930) 43 Imav. L.
Rav. 805, (1932) 30 Mic. L. Ray. 1322. Since it is similar to an original proceeding
ancillary receivership requires almost the same time and expense as the original receivership.
See 1 CLARK, REcEiv.ERs (2d ed. 1929) § 319. On the problem of the courts of what state or
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"The system established in Booth v. Clark has become the settled law of the
federal courts, and if the powers of chancery receivers are to be enlarged in
such wise as to give them authority to sue beyond the jurisdiction of the appoint-
ing court, such extension of authority must come from legislation and not from
judicial action."'10 4
The opportunity is now afforded the Court in the new rules to modernize
this procedure along the lines here suggested.105
With regard to suits by and against partnerships and unincorporated
associations, the federal courts at law have in general followed the state
practice."0 6 But in the Coronado case' when it appeared to the Supreme
states have jurisdiction to administer the affairs of a corporation in receivership see Wicker-
sham, Primary and Ancillary Receiverships (1928) 14 VA. L. R-v. 599; Note (1931) 44
HARv. L. REv. 437; 2 CLARx, RECEiVt S (2d ed. 1929) §§ 717, 755.
104. Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 248 U. S. 73, 77 (1918). For a criticism of the
Booth case see Note (1932) 30 M.ICH. L. REV. 1322, 1323 n. 2, to the effect that it followed
an obsolete English practice, and that that part of the opinion which has formed the
basis for the federal rule was dicta.
105. It should be noted, however, that the pressure for modernizing equity receiveraship
procedure has been greatly lessened by recent legislation permitting corporate reorganization
through bankruptcy. 47 Stat. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1934) (reorganization of
railroads engaged in interstate commerce); 48 Stat. 912 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1934)
(corporate reorganizations). For discussion of this legislation see Dodd, Jr., Reorganization
Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48 HTnv. L. Rnv. 1100; Foster, Con-
flicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YArx L. J. 923 and authorities cited in n. 1;
Wehle, Railroad Reorganization Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act: New Legislation
Suggested (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 197; Weinstein, Corporations Amenable to Scction. 77B
(1935) 83 U. PA. L. Ray. 853.
106. Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 172 Fed. 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Esteve Bros. & Co.
v. Harrell, 272 Fed. 382 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921); John L. Walker Co. v. National Under-
writers' Co., 3 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924); Hawthorne v. Austin Organ Co., 71 F.
(2d) 945 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 623 (1934); Empire Rice Mill Co. v.
K. & E. Neumond, 199 Fed. 800 (E. D. La. 1912). The trustee in bankruptcy of an un-
incorporated association has been permitted to sue a member at law. Coyle v. Mlorriz-dale
Coal Co., 284 Fed. 294 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd, 289 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923). A
judgment obtained against a partnership as an entity in a state court has been recovered
on in a federal court sitting in another jurisdiction. East Denver Municipal Irr. Dist. v.
Doherty, 293 Fed. 804 (S. D. N. Y. 1923), extensively discussed in Magruder and Foster,
Jurisdiction Over Partnerships (1924) 37 HAny. L. REv. 793. But a restrictive state rule
concerning unincorporated associations will not be allowed to impair a federal statutory
right. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922); Pirnie
Simons & Co. v. New York Stock Exchange, 89 N. Y. L. J. 189 (S. D. N. Y. 1933). It had
been thought that the Coronado case established a general rule that unincorporated asiacia-
tions could sue and be sued as an entity. Hansel v. Purnell, 1 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 617 (1924) (equity); Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F.
(2d) 412 (E. D. IMl. 1924) (law). But Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U. S.
113 (1933), held that a voluntary association, unless authorized by statute, had no capacity
to sue to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
107. United Aline Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 390 (1922).
"Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trade unions is of primary importance in
the working out of justice and in protecting individuals and society from pos.ibility of
oppression and injury in their lawful rights from the existence of such powerful entities
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Court that a federal substantive right would otherwise be impaired, it
treated a defendant unincorporated association as an entity, though the
state court of the forum had earlier refused to recognize the association
as such. The rule of this case and of state procedural statutes which
recognize as an entity those groups which act as units seems desirable.105
To be generally effective in cases where jurisdiction must be founded
upon diversity of citizenship the new procedure should modify the pres-
ent federal rule °9 which refuses to endow such a unit with citizenship,
but requires the citizenship of its members to be looked to. And there
is evidence that the rule is undergoing change, for the Supreme Court
recently treated a sociedad en comandita organized under Porto Rican
law as a citizen and resident of Porto Rico for purposes of federal juris-
diction.110 Such treatment might well be accorded to associations acting
as trade unions, it is after all in essence and principle merely a procedural matter." For
a discussion of this case and the general problem involved see Sturges, Uninvorporated
Associations as Parties to an Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 383; and see Magill, The Sia-
bility of Labor Unions (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 81; Roberts, Labor Unions, Corporations-
The Coronado Case (1923) 5 ILL. L. Q. 200; Comment (1922) 32 YAL L. 3. 59; Comment
(1923) 5 ILL. L. Q. 126; WARuREN, Coa'oRATv ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INcorO 0rION (1929)
648-669.
108. Substantive rights are not altered. Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524 (1889) ; United
Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922); Magruder and
Foster, Jurisdiction Over Partnerships (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 793, 796-798: ", . it Is
purely a matter of expediency whether the law shall deal with a particular group of natural
persons as a unit distinct from the members, or as an aggregation of individuals, an im-
portant consideration being the extent to which the associates, as a group, enter into
relationships with the outside world . . . the frank and consistent treatment of the firm
as a legal entity would not produce any profound modification in the substantive law of
partnership as it has actually developed in many jurisdictions, though it would give the
subject a logical coherence in place of its too frequent aspect of makeshift and patchwork."
See also Sturges supra note 107; Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations
(1929) 42 HAv. L. Rav. 977; cf. W.ARE, op. cit. supra note 107, Bk. I c. 1, 2, 3; Bk. II
c. 1, 6.
109. Thomas v. Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, 195 U. S. 207 (1904)
(while recognizing that the board was a distinct legal entity capable of suing and being sued,
it was held that the federal courts had no jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship
unless it appeared that the citizenship of the individual members was diverse from that of
the opposing party); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932), cert. granted on another ground, and case aff'd, 289 U. S. 103 (1933); Russell v.
Central Labor Union, 1 F. (2d) 412 (E. D. Ill. 1924).
The class suit offered an avenue of escape at times, for in such a suit only the citizen-
ship of.the representatives is looked to. Jurisdiction is not ousted by failure of diversity
as to members of the class represented but not made parties. See (1933) 33 COL. L, Rrv.
363-365; 1 FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1920) 703, 705-706.
As to venue it has been held that a partnership doing business in Nebraska and there
recognized as a legal entity is nevertheless not an inhabitant thereof within the meaning
of the venue statutes, where the partner', are citizens and inhabitants of Missouri. Suther-
land v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
110. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476 (1933), discussed in (1933) 33 COL.
L. Ray. 540, 541, wherein it is observed: "The present case thus appears to represent not
merely the overruling of a long course of decision in the lower federal courts but carries
with it the germ of the overturn of basic Supreme Court doctrine."
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under American law. Citizenship, for jurisdictional purposes, could be
worked out along lines developed in the corporate field.'
c) Substitution
A liberal policy as to substitution of parties plaintiff or defendant
may be hampered by a state rule against amendments stating a new
cause of action, coupled with a legalistic view of the "cause of action."
The problem may be presented by suit on a policy of life insurance
wrongly brought by the administrator of the insured's wife, although she
had predeceased the insured, and the policy was, in that event, payable
to the insured's heirs. States -with a liberal and desirable policy will
permit the necessary substitution, since the insurance company from the
first has been apprised of the real claim. The state cases have been in
conflict on the principle involved;I" - but a federal court at law, torn be-
tween the duty of following an illiberal state practice and the federal
legislation on amendments, has permitted the substitution2' This is
Ill. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 109), Chief Juztlce
Marshall decided that a corporation could not come into the federal courts except through
the actual citizenship of its members. This is the position now taken toward unincor-
porated groups. But in Louisville Ry. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844), it was
held that a corporation was a citizen of the state which created it. This position was
abandoned in Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Rr. Co., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853), but
it was held that the right to sue in the federal courts under the diversity of citizenship rule
must be based on the citizenship of its members, but that such citizenship was conclusively
presumed to be that of the state of its incorporation. See Henderson, Position of For-
eign Corporation in American Constitutional Law (191S) 54-64. The policy underlying
this development, so long as we have a diversity jurisdiction, applies with equal force to
groups which act as a unit. See Ralya Market Co. v. Armour & Co., 102 Fed. 530 (C. C.
N. D. Ia. 1900) (holding that when a partnership is sued as an entity it cannot remove);
and see McLaughlin v. Hallowell, 228 U. S. 278 (1913) (where the partners were unsu c-
cessful in seeking to have themselves substituted for the partnership so that they could
remove. See also Russell v. Central Labor Union, 1 F. (2d) 412, 414 (E. D. III. 1924)
(recognizing that the development which took place in the. corporate field might well be
applied to unincorporated associations). An association could be regarded as a citizen
and inhabitant of the state and district wherein it carries on its principal busines for pur-
poses of jurisdiction and venue. See dissent ol Manton, J., in Ex parte E*Wskh, 3 F.
(2d) 636, 638 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 851 (1929), approved in (1929)
78 U. PA. L. R-v. 102; but cf. (1929) 42 H.av. L. REv. 1079.
112. Wood v. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich. 521, 47 N. W. 1103 (1891) (amendment com-
pelled by mandamus). Contra: Lower v. Segal, 60 N. J. L. 99, 36 At]. 777 (1897); Shaw
v. Cock, 78 N. Y. 194 (1879); Spence v. Griswold, 23 Abb. N. C. 239 (N. Y. 18,9);
Pelzer v. United Dredging Co., 200 App. Div. 646, 193 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1st Dap't, 1922);
cf. People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. Cantor, 234 N. Y. 507, 138 N. E. 425 (1922),
permitting the substitution of a party petitioner in certiorari proceedings to review tax
assessments on the theory that jurisdiction attached by the filing of the application for re-
duction of the assessment, which was made in the name of the proper party.
113. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 3d, 1899) (widow in
her individual capacity substituted for herself as administrtrix). For the federal legis.
lation see U. S. Rnv. STAT. § 954 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. § 777 (1926), discused by Clark
and Moore, supra note 1, at 410, n. 105.
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eminently proper. Courts should freely permit parties to be added, sub-
stituted, or dropped. Hence the equity rules and practice taking this view
should be utilized for the new procedure.114
114. See EQuit= RuLE 19 on amendments; RuLE 37"... Any person may at any time
be made a party if his presence is necessary or proper to a complete determination of the
cause .. 2; RULE 45, DEATH or PARTn-REvvoR ON Notic; RuL 35, Bnr=s or RE-
vivoR. That the equity practice is liberal see 2 FosFm, FEDmRAL PRAcTxm (1920) § 211.
Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. § 192, which is new and was derived from the New Jersey practice
(1912) § 9: "No action or special proceeding shall be defeated by the nonjoinder or mis-
joinder of parties. New parties may be added or substituted and parties misjoined may
be dropped by order of the court at any state of the cause as the ends of justice may
require." For the English practice see BALI., The AiNUAL PRAcrTcE (1935) o. 16, r. 11.
There is supplementary federal legislation providing for the substitution of the proper
party where suit is brought by or against a public officer who dies, resigns, or is detached
from office during the pendency of the suit, 43 STAm. 941 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 780
(1926); and also for the substitution of the executor or administrator of a plaintiff, peti-
tioner, or defendant who dies before final judgment where the cause of action survives. 42
STAT. 352 (1921), 28 U. S. C. A. § 778 (1926). Prior to 1921 when the statute was
amended, it had been held that a suit could not be revived against the foreign executors
of a deceased defendant, who are not authorized by the laws of the stato of their ap-
pointment to be sued beyond its jurisdiction. C. F. Stromeyer Co. v. Aldrich, 227 Fed.
960 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); see Filer & Stowell Co. v. Rainey, 120 Fed. 718, 719 (C. C. N. D.
111. 1903); Lawrence v. Southern Pac. Co., 177 Fed. 547, 550 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1910).
But the legislative amplification of that year clearly provides for the substitution of an ex-
ecutor or administrator "appointed under the laws of any State or Territory of the United
States," for service of the scire facias in any judicial district, and that the provisions apply
to admiralty, equity, and law. With the federal situation compare that of New York.
McMaster v. Gould, 240 N. Y. 379, 148 Xt. E. 556 (1925), criticized in (1926) 39 YALE
L. J. 371.
See also U. S. Rav. STAT. (1878) § 956, 28 U. S. C. A. § 779 (1926); MeArthur v, Wil-
liamson, 45 Fed. 154 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1891).
See Clinton v. Coppedge, 2 F. Supp. 935 (N. D. Okla. 1933) (presenting the problem of
corporate dissolution pending suit); and Ballantine, Manual of Corporation Law and
Practice (1930) 806-807. Under the rule on capacity heretofore urged, the representative of
the defunct corporation, domestic or foreign, whether having title or not, would have ca-
pacity to be substituted as plaintiff or defendant. And even if he was without the Juris-
diction of the court and did not voluntarily appear probably he could be substituted with-
out personal service of process upon him, for there is a valid distinction between founding
original jurisdiction and continuing a suit well founded. Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 164
(U. S. 1838); Collh County National Bank v. Hughes, 152 Fed. 414 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907),
on rehearing, 155 Fed. 389 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907); cf. Marion Phosphate Co. v. Perry,
74 Fed. 425 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896). At the present time the appointment of a receiver for
a plaintiff or defendant corporation does not abate the suit, but it may proceed in the
corporation's name. 2 Fosmax, FEDERm PRACTICE (1920) 1194. But if the capacity of
a receiver is recognized as heretofore urged it might be well to substitute him in the cor-
poration's stead.
For the problem of substituting a party who is liable to the one sued, see Hardenbergh
v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112 (1894) (landlord substituted for his tenants in an ejectment action);
Harris v. Hess, 10 Fed. 263 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882) (by substitution the defendant
achieved the objective of interpleader).
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IV. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND PARTIES
At common law the rules on joinder of actions were governed chiefly
by the forms of action and not by principles of trial conveniencen
Similarly, joinder of parties depended upon what were considered to be
their substantive rights, and not on the simplest and quickest ways of
getting disputes litigated. Plaintiffs and defendants had to sue and be
sued in the same capacity; permissive joinder of parties having a several
right or duty, or affected by a common question of law or fact was not
tolerated." 6  On the other hand, in equity the test was largely one of
trial convenience with a view to settling the entire controversy in one
suit. It is true that the objection of multifariousness could be raised
either where there was joinder of two or more equitable causes of action,
or of parties complainant or defendant who did not possess a common
interest or right in the subject-matter in controversy, and that the rule
often prevented the joinder of actions or parties to the sacrifice of an
efficient dispatch of business." 7 But the concept of an equitable cause
of action was in general sufficiently broad to embrace all operative facts
dealing with a transaction; and complainants and defendants were often
said to have a community of interest when that interest was nothing
more than one in a common question of law or fact and a multiplicity of
suits would otherwise result."l8  And, fortunately, no rules of thumb on
multifariousness developed, for the question was generally said to be
one for the court in the exercise of its discretion. Thus the matter stood
when the Equity Rules of 1912 were adopted.
Rule 37 adopted the standard code provision for permissive joinder
of parties."' It provided that "all persons having an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as
plaintiffs, and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims
an interest adverse to the plaintiff.... ." And Rule 26 on the joinder of
causes of action authorized unlimited joinder of equitable causes of
action where there was one plaintiff, and one defendant, or if more than
one plaintiff when they jointly possessed the causes of action, and where,
if there was more than one defendant, the liability was asserted against
all of the material defendants. Thus it will be seen that notions con-
115. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions (1920) 18 MCH. L. REv. 571; SmupmxA, Com-o.
LAW PL. nDa (1923) 201-203.
116. SmImA", id. at 393-399; Hinton, An American Experiment with the Englsh Rules
ol Court (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 533, 535; Jones and Carlin, Nonjoinder and Misjoirder
of Parties in Common Law Actions (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 197, 266.
117. See 1 FOSTER, FEDmAL PRACTCE (1920) 780-804; SHpmuA, EQtur= PmEnn;G
(1897) 337-348.
118. See Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619 (U. S. 1844), and Bolles v. BolIes, 44 N. J. Eq.
385, 14 At. 593 (1888), on subject-matter; and cases and. materials in 2 Cr.nK, CsEs o:;
PLEADUM A.-D PROCEDURE (1933) 536-566; 1 FosTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1920) 782-79s;
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties (1932) 45 HAnv. L. REV. 1297, on parties.
119. CLARE:, CODE PLEADnXG 252-255.
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cerning joinder of parties produced what limitations exist on joinder of
causes. But even in the qualified situations the rule did not arbitrarily
prohibit the joinder, but authorized it when administrative grounds ap-
peared therefor. The rule has been said to prohibit nothing which was
permissible in chancery practice before its adoption, but to go further and
make the whole question merely one of convenience in the administration
of justice." ° The matter is recognized as a trial problem, and the court
is given the authority to order separate trials.
If these rules were extended to govern the new unified procedure, it
would still be more liberal than that obtaining in most of the states.
This is true because, -while the provisions relative to joinder of parties
are not essentially different from those of most states, yet the rule as
to joinder of actions has entirely swept away the artificialities of the
common law forms of action and of the classifications of joinable actions
of most of the codes. 2 ' Recent legislation in New York, New Jersey,
California, and Illinois, 2 following the English practice, may, however,
furnish the model for a yet more desirable federal system of party join-
der. This legislation generally sanctions permissive joinder of plaintiffs
where there is a common question of law or fact; joinder of plaintiffs
in the alternative; joinder of defendants "against whom the right to any
relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,"
with the proviso that each defendant need not be "interested as to all
the relief prayed for, or as to every cause of action included in the
proceeding against him"; and authorizes third parties to be brought in,
who were or would be liable to any party to an action. Now these
provisions have proved feasible and desirable both in the state courts
and on the law side in the federal courts, as notably in those sitting in
New York." But the old restrictive code section on joinder of causes
120. International Organization, etc. v. Red Jacket C. C. & Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1927) (316 complainants brought 12 suits, which were consolidated, to restrain
union interference with their businesses); Lion Laboratories v. Campbell, 34 F. (2d)
642, 644 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) ("The 26th rule has made the whole question merely one
of convenience in the administration of justice"); Low v. McMaster, 255 Fed. 23s, 236-237
(E. D. Pa. 1919) (". . . rule 26 is not . . prohibitive of anything which was before its
adoption permissible in chancery practice in the direction of reaching desirable results").
121. For the code classifications see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 298-300.
122. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 255-256, 270-276, for a discussion of the New York, New
Jersey, and California party joinder provisions; also Comment (1935) 23 CAL. L. REV.
320; for Illinois see Magill, Tlhc New Illinois Civil Practice Act: Pleading (1933) 1 U. Cmx.
L. REv. 171, 172-180. For a comparison with European systems see Millar, The Joinder of
Actions in Continental Civil Procedure (1933) 28 I1. L. Rev. 26, 177.
123. Klugman's Sons v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 42 F. (2d) 461 (S. D. N. Y. 1930)
(joinder of defendants in the alternative); Benton v. Deininger, 21 F. (2d) 657 (W. D.
N. Y. 1927) (23 plaintiffs joined to enforce rights given them by the National Bank Act
against 21 defendants, who at various times over a period of many years had been direc-
tors of the bank andc had made false reports. 57 causes of action were alleged, and each
cause did not affect all of the defendants); see Brown v. Kinnicutt, 2 F. (2d) 263 (S. D.
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of action was retained in New York and California. The anticipated
trouble developed, and after fifteen years of confusion in New York
the legislature has now repealed that section and substituted one author-
izing unlimited joinder of actions, and giving the court discretion to
direct a severance of the action or separate trials.1-4  In the recent
Illinois Act, profiting by the New York experience, this difficulty had
been avoided from the beginning.'-
In dealing with the problem of intervention, it might be advisable
that the new procedure be of broader scope than Equity Rule 37 which
requires the intervention to "be in subordination to, and in recognition
of, the propriety of the main proceeding."' With respect to repre-
sentative actions, Equity Rule 38 can be extended and applied to all
actions whenever a few individuals can be truly said to represent a
class 2  Where a number of persons have been injured by fraud or
by breach of shippers' contracts, it has been thought that there is prop-
erly no class suit, for each claim is of a personal nature.3 s And it has
been strongly doubted whether any representative suit can be maintained
at law; 2 but the contrary has been held 0  It is believed that the
N. Y. 1924) (34 plaintiffs joined in a fraud and deceit action). For illustrative English
and state cases see Universities of O-ford and Cambridge v. Gill & Sons, 1 Ch. D. 55
(1899); Payne v. British Time Recorder Co., [1921] 2 K. B. 1; Akeley v. Kinnicutt, 233
N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924). See also Bennett, Alternative Parties and the Com..nor
Law Hangover (1933) 32 MC. L. Rxv. 36.
124. On the difficulty caused by the joinder of actions provision see Ader v. Blau, 241
N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771 (1925), reprinted in 2 CLr.x, CASES oN PLEADM AnD Pnou nnuo
(1933) 496, and the authorities there collected. For the recent legislation in New York
see Ch. 339 Sess. Laws of 1935.
125. See Magill, supra note 122, at 185-186.
126. For statement of the problem and the varying rules on intervention see CLr,,
CODE P.E.nm 287-290; Intervention in Federal Equity Cases (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rv. 1312;
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 127.
127. For a suggested detailed rule see Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numer-
ous Litigants (1934) 19 Come. L. Q. 399, 441; also Blume, Jurisdictional Amount in Rep-
resentative Suits (1931) 15 MAm., L. REv. 502; Id., The "Common Questions" Pri c4i in
the Code Provision for Representative Suits (1932) 30 AicHr. L. R.y. 878; (1922) 36 Marv.
L. REv. 89; (1932) 30 MlicH. L. REv. 624 (discussing the federal rule that a common
question of law is sufficient); Note (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 118.
128. Fletcher v. Burt, 126 Fed. 619 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Cherry v. Hallowell, 4 F.
Supp. 597 (E. D. N. Y. 1931); Brown v. Werblin, 138 Misc. 29, 244 N. Y. Supp. 209 (Sup.
Ct. 1930); Aarkt & Co., Ltd. v. Knight S. S. Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 1021.
129. McNary v. Guaranty Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 616 (N. D. Ohio 1934), criticized in
(1934) 19 Come. L. Q. 614; cf. (1934) 20 VA. L. Ray. 564 (discussing Cherry v. Hallowell,
4 F. Supp. '597 (E. D. N. Y. 1931), and concluding that a true class action is in its
nature equitable].
130. Penny v. Central Coal and Coke Co., 138 Fed. 769 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) (tr--pass
for injury to freehold of a religious society); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle,
221 Fed. 590 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915)' (ejectment brought by shareholders of a dissolved cor-
poration); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (1932) (suit against an a.s.o-
ciation).
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problem is to determine whether there can be adequate representation
in the type of action and not whether it is a "legal" or "equitable" action.
Third party practice, a relatively recent development, has received
considerable attention from commentators, and its utility has been
pointed out.' 13 But the federal procedure raises one problem that is
peculiar to it. That is the problem presented by Strawbridge v. Curtis.'
If we assume a case between A and B properly brought in federal court,
under the doctrine of that case, shall we require diversity between B
and C, where B wishes to bring C in as a third party? Tentatively,
it seems to us unwise to extend the rule of that early case to cover a
procedural device which is just developing and which affords to litigants
and courts an opportunity of disposing of a litigious situation in one
action; and furthermore, such an extension would deprive B of a valu-
able procedural remedy which he would enjoy if A had chosen the state
forum, assuming that there is a third party practice in the state. 133-
131. Bennett, Bringing in Third Parties by the Defendant (1935) 19 MIrN. L. R.. 163;
Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendants' Rights Against Third Parties (1933) 33
COL. L. REv. 1147; Gregory, Procedurat Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution in the In-
jured Plaintiff's Action (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 209; Id., Tort Contribution Practice In
New York (1935) 20 Corn. L. Q. 269.
132. 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806) (there must be complete diversity of citizenship be-
tween the parties plaintiff on one side and the parties defendant on the other).
133. The Supreme Court has appreciated that litigation involving third party practice
deserves treatment peculiar to it, that the litigation should not be dismembered. For when
A sued B in tort in the state court, and B brought in C to recoup against the latter under
an insurance contract and there was diversity between B and C it was assumed that this
presented a separable controversy and thus the entire suit would go into federal court on
removal, instead of just the B-C litigation which would have been the case had this been
regarded as a separate action. See City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
293 U. S, 140 (1934). There was diversity between A and C, but this is immaterial, for
there is no litigation between them. Lowry & Co., Inc. v. National City Bank of New
York, 28 F. (2d) 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
It has been held that there must be diversity between B and C or that some other juris-
dictional ground exist before third party practice can be invoked in federal court. Wilson
v. United American Lines, 21 F. (2d) 872 (S. D. N. Y. 1927); Sperry v. Keeler Transporta-
tion Line, 28 F. (2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1928). Assuming that these cases have not Im-
properly interpreted the implications of Strawbridge v. Curtis, still it would seem that the
Supreme Court might by rule restrict the doctrine of the case to prevent impairing the
utility of the device. The Court has restricted the doctrine in situations where it was
thought advisable to dispose of an entire situation. Judge Blatchford permitted a defendant
to bring in and substitute a third party for himself, although there was no diversity be-
tween them. Harris v. Hess, 10 Fed. 263 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882) (jurisdictional point
assumed). And it is well settled that where the substitution is made, the original juris-
diction is not defeated. Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U. S. 236 (1886); Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151
U. S. 112 (1894) (in these cases the third party came in voluntarily). Diversity is not re-
quired for intervention, the converse of third party practice, SmxncNs, op. cit. siepra note
34, at 684; nor for cross suits between defendants, Ames Realty Co. v. Big Indian Mining
Co., 146 Fed. 166 (C. C. D. Mont. 1906) (in a water right suit defendants could litigate
among themselves their priorities); SirmK~s, id. at 667. If there is diversity between a
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In concluding this r~sum6 of the more important problems affecting
pleadings and parties which the new federal civil procedure must face,
we would again emphasize the tentative nature of our suggestions of
details. It is obvious that considerable variation in detail is possible
and still the essentials of the reform will be secured. In fact if the
vital provisions for a completely united procedure with clear specifica-
tions as to jury trials and waiver thereof are adopted, and if flexible
rules as to pleadings and parties, leaving much to the discretion of the
trial court, are drafted, we shall feel that the reform is assured of suc-
cess, whatever the detailed provisions may be. It is clear, too, that
with the considerable research and interest in procedural reform which
has developed in recent years, there is very close to unanimity of opinion
on many, perhaps most of the objectives to be sought in these points
of detail. This is an auspicious time for the new procedure and, thanks
to the decisive leadership now assumed by the Supreme Court, its promise
is most bright.'34
stakeholder and the claimants, the court may proceed to a decree though the real contro-
versy is between the claimants and there is no diversity between them. Turman Oil Co.
v. Lathrop, S F. Supp. 870 (N. D. Okl. 1934). Thus, if the third-party litigation i3
regarded as auxiliary to the main suit the jurisdictional amount and grounds become im-
material.
134. Since this article went to press and on June 3, 1935, the Supreme Court promul-
gated an order appointing its Advisory Committee on the new rules with the Honorable
William D. Mitchell as Chairman and the senior author hereof as member of and Reporter
to the Committee. The warning given in the text as to the tentative nature of the con-
clusions here set forth should be reiterated, and it should, of course, be clear that thee are
but the private and unofficial views of the authors.
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